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FUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY-SUIT AT LAW FOR
PURCHASE PRICE OF LAND
Upon breach by the vendee of an executory contract for the
sale of land, the weight of authority is that the vendor's remedy
is in equity for specific performance, or at law for damages,
rather than an action at law for the contract price.1 Tins is the
rule laid down in the leading English case of Lasrd v. Pim2 decided in 1841. The reason given in this case is that the title to
land can pass only by deed and a recovery of the purchase money
will leave the title in the vendor, thus allowing hun to have both
the land and the vendee's money The above rule has met particular favor in those jurisdictions drawing sharp distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity 3
A substantal nnority4 of the jurisdictions, however, have
taken the position that the vendor in an executory land contract
1
Maury v. Unruh, 220 Ala. 455, 126 So. 113 (1930), Piper v.
Cooper-Atha-Bar Real Estate & Mortgage Co., 113 Fla. 337, 151 So.

495 (1933), Reed v. Dougherty, 94 Ga. 661, 20 S. E. 965 (1894),
Goodwme v. Kelley, 33 Ind. 57, 70 N. E. 832 (1904), Prichard v.
Mullhall, 127 Iowa 545, 103 N. W 774 (1905), Old Colony R. R. Corp.
v. Evans, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 25, 66 Am. Dec. 394 (1856), Freeman v.

Paulson, 107 Minn. 64, 119 N. W 651, 131 Am. St. Rep. 438 (1909),
Colson v. Johnson's Estate, 111 Neb. 773, 197 N. W 674, 35 A. L. R.
924 (1924), Griswold v. Sabin, 51 N. H. 167, 12 Am. Rep. 76 (1871),
Besmger v. Erhardt, 74 App. Div 169, 77 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1902),
Dooley v Stillson, 46 R. I. 332, 128 Atl. 217 (1925), Jones v. Tschet-

ter, 46 S. D. 520, 194 N. W 839 (1923).
'7 M. & W 474, 151 Eng. Rep. 852 (1841).

3
Thorp v. Rutherford, 150 Ore. 157, 43 P (2d) 907 (1935),
Prichard v. Mulhall, 127 Iowa 545, 103 N. W 774 (1905), cited supra
note 1.
4
Weisenberg v. Hirschhorn, 97 Cal. App. 532, 275 Pac. 997
(1929); Bormer v. Finney, 110 Cal. App. 518, 294 Pac. 466 (1930),
Gilpin Co. Mining Co. v. Drake, 8 Cal. 586, 9 Pac. 787 (1886), Smith
v. Independent School Dist., 48 Idaho 295, 282 Pac. 84 (1929), Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 Ill. 511, 179 N. E. 42 (1931), Hodges v.
Moore, 102 Miss. 532, 59 So. 827 (1912), Olmsteak v. Smith, 87 Mo.

602 (1885), Hamilton Co. v. Battson, 99 Mont. 583, 44 P (2d) 1064

(1935), Corby v. Ward, 112 N. J. L. 486, 171 At. 813 (1934), Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 27 Ohio L. Ab. 19, 14 N. E. (2d) 1 (1938),
Dubois v. Andrews, 57 Okla. 227, 152 Pac. 440 (1915), Heights Land
Co. v. Swengel's Estate, 319 Pa. 298, 179 Atl. 431 (1935), Phillips v.
The Maccabees, (Tex. App.) 50 S. W (2d) 478 (1932), Turner &
Happersett v. Hall & Connor, 128 Va. 247, 104 S. E. 861 (1920)
Seaver v. Lang, 92 Vt. 501, 104 Atl. 877 (1918), Rose v. Rundall, 86
Wash. 422, 150 Pac. 614 (1915), Jefferson Gardens v. Terxan, 216
Wisc. 230, 257 N. W 154 (1934), 5 Williston, Contracts (1937) Sec.
1399; Note (1939) 5 Ohio St. L. J. 222, 224.
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containing dependent covenants may maintain a law action m
assumpsit against the vendee for the balance due on the full
purchase price, amounting in effect to a suit at law for specific
performance.5 The objectionable qualities of an action for the
purchase price mentioned in Laird v. Pim are avoided by requirmg the vendor to evidence his good faith by depositing the deed
in court at the beginnig of the action, to be awarded to the
vendee if the suit is successful.
Kentucky has been cited as among those states allowing an
action at law for the purchase price,0 but it is doubtful whether
the precise question has ever been passed upon in this state.
However, there is some dictum to lead one to believe that such an
action may be maintained.
In Golden v. Rsverstde Coal and Timber Co., 7 the appellant
was defendant in a former action to which the appellee was not
a party In the former action the plaintiff sought to have an
agreement with appellant concerning the sale of land declared
an option to purchase which had expired rather than a contract
to sell, thereby removing a cloud from the plaintiff's title. The
appellant filed a counter claim for a judgment requiring the
plaintiff to specifically perform the contract, which was granted.
Before judgment had been rendered the plaintiff sold the land to
the present appellee, against whom appellant filed a bill alleging
that the appellee had actual notice of his contract and prayed
that he be required to release any claim of ownership. The
vendor (plaintiff in the former action) joined with appellee and
their defense was that appellant was insolvent and unable to
carry out his contract. The court held that the vendor could
not abandon the contract under circumstances which justified a
judgment against him in favor of appellant for specific performance and that the vendor's remedy "was to tender a good title
'See, Noyes v. Brown, 142 Minn. 211, 171 N. W 803,,805 (1919),

Fairlawn Heights Co. v Theis, 27 Ohio Abs. 19, 14 N. E. (2d) 1, 4

(1938) Black v. American International Corp., 264 Pa. 260, 264,
Atl. 737, 739 (1919), 5 Williston, Contracts (1937) Sec. 1366.
'66 P. J. Sec. 1357 at page 1358, citing Golden v Cornett,
Ky. 133,'195 S. W 1080 (1917) Golden v. Lewis, 176 Ky. 28,
S. W 144 (1917). In the latter case the court said: "Where land
been sold by executory contract, the remedy of the seller, in

107

176
195
has

the
absence of facts which would justify its cancellation, when the buyer
fails or refuses to take the property according to the contract, is to
bring a suit to recover the purchase money- or, in other words for
a performance of the contract."
184 Ky. 200, 211 S. W 761 (1919).
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and sue for specific performance-of the contract, ors for a
recovery of the purchase money "9 Thins dictum may indicate
that the court recognized the possibility of a suit at law for the
purchase price.
Since there is no Kentucky decision directly upon the point
it cannot definitely be said that Kentucky would allow an action
at law for the purchase price. Nor is the dictum in the case
mentioned strong enough to warrant such a view. But assuming
the propriety of such action, would its effect be to decrease the
jurisdiction of equity over the same type of case, thus making it
more difficult to maintain an equity action for specific performance where the sole object of the suit is a money judgment?
Clearly the jurisdiction of equity is not diminished. The power
of courts of equity to deal with land or any interest therein is
firmly established. Equity jurisdiction, once established because
of the inadequacy or absence of a remedy at law, is not defeated
by an extension by the law courts of the scope of their remedies
so as to render them adequate.10 In such cases the plaintiff is not
compelled to resort to his legal remedy but rather may seek
relief either at law or in equity
Although when the sole object of a suit is to obtain the
purchase price of land the result in law and in equity is
ostensibly the same, there are certain procedural incidents
attaching to each remedy which may be material in determining
whnch is more advantageous. Laches, marketable title, and
hardshnp are defenses because of which equity may refuse to
grant specific performance in a particular case. Whether or not
these equitable defenses should be caried over to law actions is
a matter upon which authorities differ."i Probably law courts
now follow the requirement of marketable title. 1 2

However, a

person may be barred by his laches from obtaining specific
performance of a contract in equityis whereas he might bring an
' Italics added.
"184 Ky. 200, 207, 211 S. W 761, 764 (1919).
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurzsprudence (5th Ed. 1941) Sec. 182;

Clark, Principlesof Equity (1924) Sec. 16; 30 C. J. S. Equity See. 21;

ibzd. Sec. 23a; C. J. Equity Sec. 21 and cases cited.
"Note (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 545, for a general discussion of
the subject and authorities cited.
'Walsh, Treatise on Equity (1930) 381; Ethington v Rigg, 173
Ky. 355, 191 S. W 98 (1917), Note (1909) 22 Harvard L. Rev. 529.
" 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941) Sec. 419, 452;

Cocanaugher v. Green, 93 Ky. 519, 14 Ky L. Rep. 507, 20 S. W 542
(1892).
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action at law up until the time the statutory period of limitation
expires. The plaintiff then would find it advantageous to sue
at law only when by Ins own neglect he has placed himself in a
position where the defendant might invoke against hm the
doctrine of laches. Also specific performance in equity will be
denied when it appears that hardship or injustice will result to
one of the parties. 14 Since law courts usually do not look behind
the legal right asserted by the plaintiff to determine if undue
hardship will result to the defendant, 15 a law suit will prove
advantageous to the plaintiff under circumstances winch would
provide the defendant with the defense of undue hardship if the
action were brought in equity 16 The plaintiff would be to a
great extent guided by his own conduct and by a survey of the
possible defenses available to the defendant in order to determine
whether equity or law affords the better remedy under the
particular circumstances of his case.
HNRY H. BRAmBLET

'Lexmgton and E. R. Co. v. Williams, 183 Ky. 343, 209 S. W
59 (1919), Rogers Bros. Coal Co. v. Day, 222 Ky. 443, 1 S. W (2d)

540 (1927); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurnsprudence (5th Ed. 1941) Sec.
1405a.
'A party is not discharged merely because the contract turns
out to be difficult, unreasonable, dangerous or burdensome, Runyon
v. Culver, 168 Ky. 45, 181 S. W 640 (1916).
"Woollums v. Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S. W 781 (1892)

